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THE ILLINOIS PROBATE ACT:
DISPOSITIONS SUBJECT TO CONTRARY
WILL INTENT
INTRODUCTION

That the testator's intention governs the interpretation of
a will is one of the major rules of judicial construction.' When
the testator's intention is clearly expressed in the will, it is entitled to preference over an interpretation that the testator
meant something other than what is clearly stated.2 Absent
a clear statement of intent, the courts are at liberty to employ
the canons of construction to arrive at a determination of the
testator's intention. In so doing, the language of the clause in
question and the provisions of the entire will are considered,3
as well as the circumstances surrounding the testator at the time
4
of the making of the will.
Absent a clear indication of the testator's intention, the
distribution of property under the will and the administration
of the estate is controlled by statute.-" In ascertaining the intention of an ambiguously drafted will, the courts will proceed on
the assumption that the testator was knowledgeable of the applicable statutory provisions and acted in accordance therewith.
In this manner, judicial interpretation of ambiguous testamentary provisions often results in defeating the testator's actual intention. The Probate Act, however, enables a testator to avoid
statutory regulation of the construction of a will by manifesting
his contrary intent.
Knowledge of the operation of these provisions is imperative
since they control the distribution of property and the administration of the estate absent a clear indication of the testator's
1. See Bartlett v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 358 Ill. 452, 193 N.E. 501
(1934); Dahmer v. Wensler, 350 Ill. 23, 182 N.E. 799 (1932); Continental
Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hardeen. 306 Ill. App. 123, 28 N.E.2d 124
(1940); Chicago Daily News Fresh Air Fund v. Kerner, 305 Ill. App. 237,
27 N.E.2d 310 (1940).
2. Bartlett v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 358 Ill. 452, 457, 193 N.E.
501, 503 (1934).
3. See Dahmer v. Wensler, 350 Ill. 23, 182 N.E. 799 (1932); Suiter v.
Suiter, 323 Ill. 519, 154 N.E. 337 (1926); Porterfield v. Lenover, 310 Ill.
App. 37, 33 N.E.2d 718 (1941); Chicago Daily News Fresh Air Fund v.
Kerner, 305 Ill. App. 237, 27 N.E.2d 310 (1940).
4. See Dahmer v. Wensler, 350 Ill. 23, 182 N.E. 799 (1932); Porterfield v. Lenover, 310 Ill. App. 37, 33 N.E.2d 718 (1941).
5. See People v. Flanagin, 331 Ill. 203,162 N.E. 848 (1928); Buerger
v. Buerger, 317 Ill. 401, 148 N.E. 274 (1925); Zakroczymski v. Zakroczymski, 303 Ill. 264, 135 N.E. 398 (1922); Hardesty v. Mitchell, 302 Ill. 369,
134 N.E. 745 (1922); Dibble v. Winter, 247 Ill. 243, 93 N.E. 145 (1910).
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intention. Knowledge of the type of language which constitutes
contrary intent is important for two reasons. First, the draftsman
must know what language may be used to avoid the operation of the statute if that is the testator's desire. Secondly, he
must know what language to use when the testator's desire is
to follow the statutory scheme so that the testamentary provisions are not mistakenly interpreted by the courts as indicating a
contrary intent.
Sample clauses, suggesting various methods by which to
express contrary intent, may help reduce the possibility of prolonged battles over the construction and interpretation of wills.
The best way to avoid legal entanglements, however, is to unequivocally declare the testator's intentions in his will.
SECTION 2-4-ADOPTED CHILDREN

Section 2-4 provides that an adopted child is to be treated as
a descendant of the adopting parent for the purpose of inheritance
from the adopting parent and from the lineal and collateral kindred of the adopting parent. Section 2-4(e) states that an
adopted child is to be treated as a natural child for the purpose
of determining property rights under any instruments executed
on or after September 1, 1955, unless a contrary intent is clearly
indicated in the instrument.6 On first reading, it would appear
that an adopted child has the same rights as a child born in wedlock. The Probate Act, however, does not define the term "natural child." Cases from other jurisdictions have defined this
a bastard or an illegitimate child or a child born
term as meaning
7
out of wedlock.
The courts must interpret the terminology in a will to
determine whether the testator intended to include or exclude
adopted children. Terms, such as "children," are construed so
that they are consistent with other provisions in the will. The
6. Probate Act of 1975 § 2-4, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-4 (1975) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 14 (1939)), which provides,
For the purpose of determining the property rights of any person
under any instrument executed on or after September 1, 1955, an
adopted child is a natural child unless the contrary intent plainly
appears by the terms of the instrument. This subsection does not
apply in determining the taker of the property under any instrument

executed before September 1, 1955.
Construction of Written Instruments with Regard to Adopted Children
Act § 1, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 11-2 (1975) uses similar language in
defining adopted child for adoption purposes. It provides,
For the purpose of determining the property rights of any person
under any written instrument executed on or after September 1,
1955, an adopted child is deemed a natural child unless the contrary
intent plainly appears by the terms thereof.
7. Lathan v. Edwards, 121 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1941); Marshall v. Wabash R. Co., 46 F. 269 (S.D. Ohio 1891); State v. Colition, 73 N.D. 582,
17 N.W.2d 546 (1945).
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facts and circumstances existing at the time of the will's execution are often referred to by the courts in determining the testator's intention.
An adopted child was held not to be included in the meaning
of the word "children" in Moffet v. Cash,8 where the testator
devised to each of his sons a life estate with a remainder over
"to his children" and devised to each of his daughters a life
estate with a remainder over to "the issue of her body." Another
provision in the will stated that the sons and daughters were
only to take a life estate with the remainder to his or her children.
The court reasoned that the latter provision indicated the testator's intention to make no distinction between the type of
child that could take a life estate from a daughter and the type
that could take a life estate from a son-both had to be "issue
of the body."
In determining the testator's intention, the court
not only looked to the specific language used throughout the will
but also looked to the circumstances existing at the time of the
making of the will. The court was swayed by the fact that the
son's child was adopted twenty-six years after the testator's
death indicating that the testator probably had not considered
the-possibility of an adopted grandchild.
In Miller v. Wick, 10 the testator's will provided that upon
his sister's death, one-third of the income from the trust property
was to be paid to the testator's nephew for his life "or until such
time in his life as he shall have a child, his lawful issue, who
shall attain unto the age of three years," in which event the
nephew was to receive the principal of one-third of the trust.
The nephew adopted a child after the testator's death who subsequently claimed that he was entitled to one-third of the principal.
The phrase to "have a child, his lawful issue," according to the
court, indicated that the testator intended that a child be begotten
by and born to the nephew in wedlock. 11 However, in Munie v.
Grunewald, an adopted child was held to be included in the word
"children" under a provision in a will which gave property to
the testator's children after the death of his wife with a provision
that in case of the death of either of the children during the
wife's lifetime the deceased's share should go to his "children."
The distinguishing feature according to the court was the testator's knowledge of the adoption. The court was impressed by
the fact that the testator had treated the adopted child in the
same manner he had treated his other grandchildren. The court
reasoned that if the testator had intended to exclude this child
8. 346 Ill. 287, 178 N.E. 658 (1931).
9. Id. at 293-94, 178 N.E. at 660.
10. 311 Ill. 269, 142 N.E. 490 (1924).

11. Id. at 276, 142 N.E. at 492.
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from participating in his estate, he could have limited the devise
to the "heirs of his body," the "children of the blood of his chil'1 dren," or the "children born to his children. 2
"Descendant" is another term which the courts have had to
construe when adopted children claim under the will. "Descendant" is synonymous with "issue," and an adopted child does not
come within the ordinary meaning of "issue" unless there is language in the will or circumstances surrounding the testator at
the time he made the will indicating that the adopted child was
intended to be included.1 3 The claim of an adopted child that
he was entitled to take under a will as a "descendant" was rejected in Stewart v. Lafferty.1 Because the will was executed
three years before the adopted child's birth and the adoption took
place six years after testator's death, the court reasoned that
neither the language of the will nor the surrounding circumstantestator intended a special meaning for the
ces indicated that the
'
word "descendant.' 1
Ordinarily the term "heirs" does not include adopted children as is illustrated in Orme v. Northern Trust Co.'" The will
in question provided that the testatrix's granddaughters were
to receive life estates and that on the death of the last surviving granddaughter the trust estate was to be divided equally
among the "children or heirs" of the granddaughters. An
adopted child of a granddaughter, who claimed he was entitled to a share of the estate as an adopted heir of the granddaughter, was excluded from taking under the will since the
court found an intention to limit the property to the testatrix's
blood kin. The court based its determination on the testatrix's
exclusion of the husbands of the granddaughters and on a provision for a gift over to their "issue," which at that time meant heirs
17
of the body.
These cases illustrate that the courts will determine the
testator's, intention regarding the inclusion or exclusion of an
adopted child in his will according to the language used by the
testator and by circumstances surrounding the testator at the
time of the making of the will. Special attention must be given
to the problem of adopted children during the drafting of a will
since the words "children," "heirs," and "issue" have been conMunie v. Grunewald, 289 Ill. 468, 472, 124 N.E. 605, 607 (1919).
Stewart v. Lafferty, 12 Ill. 2d 224, 145 N.E.2d 640 (1957).
Id.
Id. at 228, 145 N.E.2d at 642-43.
16. 25 Il. 2d 151, 183 N.E.2d 505, cert. denied, 83 S. Ct. 308 (1962).
17. Id. at 161, 183 N.E.2d at 512 (citing Keegan v. Garaghty, 101 Ill.
26 (1881) and Winchell v. Winchell, 259 I1. 471, 102 N.E. 823 (1913)).
12.
13.
14.
15.
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strued to manifest an intent to exclude adopted children.,
Therefore, it would be beneficial to include a clause which would
clearly state whether adopted children are to be included or excluded when words such as "issue," "children," and "heirs" are
used, in light of the ambiguity such words create.1 9 The'utilization of such a clause will lessen the likelihood that the will could
be construed in a manner which was not contemplated by the
testator or his attorney.
SECTION 4-10-AftER-BORN

CHILDREN

A child of a testator born after the execution of the will
is entitled to receive what would be his intestate share of the
estate, unless there is a provision in the will for the child, or
it appears by the will that it was the testator's intention to disinherit him. 20 The underlying basis for this provision is the presumption that the testator would have provided for such a child
if he had anticipated the event.2' Therefore, if any provision
is made in the will for after-born children, they will be unable
to seek the benefits of the statute. Even though a provision for
the after-born or for a class including the after-born is contingent
and has the effect of disinheritance when the contingency does
not occur, the statute will not operate to give the after-born a
22
share in the testate assets.
The testator may also avoid the operation of the statute by
expressing an intention in his will to disinherit after-born children. It is not necessary to use express terms to disinherit,
since the intention to disinherit may be implied. An implied
intention to disinherit cannot arise by proof of the facts and circumstances surrounding the testator unless language in the will
itself indicates an intention to disinherit. 23 Where the language
18. Hardin & Gill, Will Clauses to Cover Adopted Children, 47 ILL.
B.J. 360, 361 (1957).

19. For example, the drafter could incorporate a clause which provides:
The word 'children,' whenever used in this will, is intended to

mean children by birth and blood and not by adoption [or mean
children both by blood and adoption].
9A R. HOBBET, K. SIMON, & E. SMITH, NICHOLS CYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL
FORMS § 9.1361 (rev. 1977).
20. Probate Act of 1975 § 4-10, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 4-10 (1975)
(formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 48 (1939)), which provides:
Unless provision is made in the will for a child of the testator

born after the will is executed or unless it appears by the will that
it was the intention of the testator to disinherit the child, the child
is entitled to receive the portion of the estate to which he would
be entitled if the testator died intestate and all legacies shall abate
proportionately therefor.
21. 2 J. MURPHY, MURPHY'S WILL CLAUSES § 428.17 (1975).
22. Osborn v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank, 116 Ill. 130, 4 N.E. 791 (1886).
23. Kahn, Probate and Trust Questions, 41 ILL. B.J. 17 (1952).
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employed in the will is ambiguous, parol evidence concerning the
facts and circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of
the execution of the will may be introduced. Although parol
evidence may not be used to import a new intention into the
will, it may be used to clarify the intention of the testator as
24
expressed by the terms of the will.
The outcome of the cases concerning after-born children have
revolved around the facts and circumstances surrounding the
testator at the time the will was executed. Although there are
no clearly defined rules regarding the significance of certain factual situations, the courts have generally reacted to similar situations in a consistent manner. Where a testator has no children at
the time he executed his will and made no express provision in his
will to disinherit after-born children, the courts have generally
found no intention to disinherit them and have allowed them
their intestate share under the statute, presuming that the testator was relying on the statute. 25 The courts have indulged in
this presumption even though the testator was expecting a child
at the time he executed the will. 26 If the testator had children
at the time of the execution of his will and an absolute provision was made for them, the courts have not found an intention to disinherit the after-born children.2 7 However, if the
testator had not provided for his then existing children, the
courts have been swayed to find an intention to disinherit
after-born children. 28 Furthermore, an intention to disinherit
24. Hedlund v. Miner, 395 Ill. 217, 69 N.E.2d 862 (1946); Hawkins
v. McKee, 321 Ill. 198, 151 N.E. 577 (1926); Froehlich v. Minwegen, 304
Ill. 462, 136 N.E. 669 (1922); Peet v. Peet, 229 Ill. 341, 82 N.E. 376 (1907);

Hawhe v. Chicago &W. Ind. R.R., 165 Ill. 561, 46 N.E. 240 (1897).
25. Hawkins v. McKee, 321 Ill. 198, 151 N.E. 577 (1926)

(Where testa-

tor's will made before birth of children indicates no intention respecting
after-born children and no circumstances established such intention, it
could not be said that the testator intended to disinherit the after-born

children, and the devises and legacies abated in proportion to what children were entitled to receive). Cf. Froehlich v. Minwegen, 304 111. 462,
136 N.E. 669 (1922) (Where testator had two children born at the time
his will was made who were disinherited by express terms and five children were born therafter for whom no provision was made, the fact that
testator allowed his will to remain unrevoked showed conclusively that
he intended for his wife to have the property).
26. Hedlund v. Miner, 395 Ill. 217, 69 N.E.2d 862 (1946) (Where testa-

tor, having no children but expecting the birth of a child, executed a
will devising his property to his wife absolutely, the court held that the
will did not disclose intention to disinherit the child, and, therefore, the
child was entitled to the portion of the testator's estate which he would

have been entitled to if there had been no will).
27. Lurie v. Radnitzer, 166 Ill. 609, 46 N.E. 1116 (1897) (Where the
will gave two-fifths to testator's wife and one-fifth to each of three children and one-fifth to an unborn child, but the clauses referring to the
unborn child were crossed out, the court held that it did not appear that
it was the testator's intention to disinherit such unborn child).
28. Peet v. Peet, 229 Ill. 341, 82 N.E. 376 (1907) (Where testator died
leaving a widow and two sons, the youngest of whom was born after the

making of the will by which he bequeathed all his property to his wife,
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may be found if there is a provision granting contingent rights
to children alive at the time the will was executed, and the provision has the effect of disinheritance in the event the contingency
29
fails to occur.
Although it seems fairly predictable as to whether or not the
courts will find an intention to disinherit after-born children in a
given factual situation, the draftsman should not rely on anything
less than a direct reference to the after-born child. The response
from the courts absent such a reference may be predictable, but
it cannot be doubted that the response may not always coincide
with the testator's true desires had he been confronted with the
question of after-born children. Furthermore, it would probably
be a rare occasion that a testator who desires to provide for afterborn children would actually make a provision for a bequest
equal to their intestate shares. The testator, therefore, should
either specifically provide for the disinheritance of such children ° or specifically provide for an alternate scheme of distri1
bution which includes such children.3
SECTION

15-1-SPOUSE AND

CHILD AWARDS

Section 15-1 of the Probate Act provides that the surviving
spouse of a resident decedent is entitled to receive a spouse's
the court held that the will disclosed an intention that neither son should
take any interest, and, therefore, the son was not entitled to an abatement
of the widow's devise); Hawhe v. Chicago & W. Ind. R.R., 165 Ill. 561,
46 N.E. 240 (1897) (Where testator made his will the day before his
death, giving his entire estate to his wife with full power to sell and
convey all property and making no provision for his two children, the
court held that it was the testator's intention to disinherit an after-born
child).
29. See Osborn v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank, 116 Ill. 130, 4 N.E. 791 (1886).
The provision in Osborn, however, was a contingent class gift to his children and, therefore, included after-born children. See text accompanying
note 22 supra.
30. The testator could disinherit after-born children by including in
his will a clause which provides:
The birth or adoption of a child by me after the execution of
this will shall have no effect upon the disposition of the estate herein
bequeathed and devised.
3 H. WILLIAMS & J. HAUGHEY, HORNER PROBATE PRACTICE AND ESTATES §

1493 (1961).
31. The testator could provide for alternate schemes of distribution
in a number of ways. For example:
If, after making this will, there shall be a child or children hereafter born to me, then I direct that such child or children shall be
entitled to the same share both of principal and income and payable
in the same manner as to time as though this will were executed
after the birth of such child, and such birth of a child or children
shall in no wise invalidate this will.
Or, for example:

In case a child is born after the execution of this

that
3 H. WILLIAMS
1583 (1961).

will,

I direct

& J. HAUGHEY, HORNER PROBATE PRACTICE AND ESTATES

§
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award. The award is a sum of money which the court deems
reasonable for the proper support of the surviving spouse
in a manner suited to the condition of life of the surviving spouse
and the condition of the estate for a period of nine months after
the decedent's death.3 2 The surviving spouse is automatically entitled to the award, unless either the unrenounced will provides
3
or the surviving
that the provisions are in lieu of the award ,:
34
contract.
by
award
the
to
spouse has waived the right
In order to bar one's right to receive a spouse's award, the
5
terms of the instrument, whether it is a will or a contract, must
sufficiently manifest an intention to deny the right. The Act
does not require the use of the exact words, "widow's award"
or "surviving spouse award" to effectuate a denial of the award.
All that is required is language broad enough to disclose the testator's intention to bar the spouse's award. 36 In the absence of
an express reference to the award, however, the question of
whether certain language is broad enough to include the award
is subject to litigation.
It has been held that a wife's waiver of all her rights to
"dower, .. .or by virtue of any statutory provision made for
her benefit in lieu of dower," or that she might have "to a dis32. Probate Act of 1975 § 15-1 (a), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 15-1 (a)
(1975) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 178(a) (1939)), which provides:
The surviving spouse of a deceased resident of this State whose
estate, whether testate or intestate, is administered in this State,

shall be allowed as the surviving spouse's own property, free from

execution, garnishment or attachment in the hands of the representative, such a sum of money, as the court deems reasonable for the

proper support of the surviving spouse for the period of 9 months

after the death of the decedent in a manner suited to the condition
in life of the surviving spouse and to the condition of the estate
and such additional sum of money as the court deems reasonable
for the proper support, during such period, of minor and adult dependent children of the decedent who reside with the surviving
spouse at the time of decedent's death. The award may in no case
be less than $5,000, together with an additional sum not less than
$1,000 for each such child. The award shall be paid to the surviving
spouse at such time or times not exceeding 3 installments, as the
court directs. If the surviving spouse dies before the award for his
support is paid in full, the amount unpaid shall be paid to his estate.
If the surviving spouse dies or abandons a child before the award
for the support of a child is paid in full, the amount unpaid shall
be paid for the benefit of the child to such person as the court directs.
33. Probate Act of 1975 § 15-1(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 15-1(b)
(1975) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 182 (1939)), which provides:
The surviving spouse is entitled to the award unless the will of the
decedent expressly provides that the provisions thereof for the sur-

viving spouse are in lieu of the award and the surviving spouse does

not renounce the Will.
App. 2d 217, 213 N.E.2d 8
34. See In re Estate of Cullen, 66 Ill.
(1965).

35. See id. (Where the court held that section 182 of the Probate Act

of 1939, the predecessor of § 15-1(b), applied to antenuptial agreements
and was not limited by the language of the act to wills).
36. Id. at 226, 213 N.E.2d at 12.
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tributive share in any personal property" of her husband, did
not create a release of her widow's award. 37 The court reasoned
that this language was not broad enough to include the widow's
award since the widow's award is neither dower, in lieu of dower,
nor is it a distributive share in personalty.S A widow's claim
to the award was barred, however, where the testator bequeathed one-third of his estate to his wife "in lieu of dower
rights, and of all other rights, interests and claims which she
might have or claim in or to my estate. '39 The court felt this
language showed a clear intention that the widow was to take
only the one-third specifically given in the will and that no part
40
of the estate should descend according to the statute.
Although it is not absolutely necessary, it would be advisable
for the draftsman of a will to use the exact words as set forth
in the statute if it is intended that the surviving spouse not be
entitled to the award. There would be little room for argument
over a clause which stated that "the provisions hereof for the
surviving spouse are in lieu of the award."
SECTIONS

2-7

AND

2-8-

DISCLAIMER AND RENUNCIATION

Section 2-7 enables an heir, legatee, or beneficiary to disclaim
in whole or in part the succession to any real or personal property given by will or by testamentary power of appointment,
if they file a written disclaimer in the manner prescribed by the
section.4 ' Section 2-8 provides that the testator's surviving
spouse may renounce a will, whether or not the will contains any
provision for the benefit of the surviving spouse, provided that
the surviving spouse files a written instrument declaring the renunciation in compliance with the method set forth in the statute. 42 If the surviving spouse's renunciation of the will causes
37. In re Estate of Guttman, 349 Ill. App. 58, 61, 110 N.E.2d 87, 88
(1952).
38. Id. at 62, 110 N.E.2d at 89.
39. Cowdrey v. Hitchcock, 103 Ill. 262, 271 (1882).
40. Id. at 272.
41. Probate Act of 1975 § 2-7(e), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-7(e) (1975)
(formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 15d (1939)), which provides:
Unless the decedent or donee of the power has otherwise provided by will, the property or interest therein or part thereof dis-

claimed descends or shall be distributed as if the disclaimant had

predeceased the decedent, or if the disclaimant is one designated to
take pursuant to a power of appointment exercised by a will, as
if the disclaimant had predeceased the donee of the power. In every

case the disclaimer relates back for all purposes to the date of death
of the decedent or the donee, as the case may be.

42. Probate Act of 1975 § 2-8(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-8(c) (1975)
(formerly ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 16a (1939)), which provides:
If a will is renounced in the manner provided by this Section,
any future interest which is to take effect in possession or enjoyment
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legacies or devises given to others to be diminished or increased,
the court may abate from or add to the legacies or devises so
as to apportion the loss or increase among all legatees and de4
visees in proportion to the amount and value of their legacies.
The result of a disclaimer, which is, in reality, a release of
one's interest in the property, 44 is that the property or interest
disclaimed will descend or will be distributed as if the disclaimant had predeceased the testator or the donee of the
power, unless the decedent or donee has provided otherwise
by will.4 5 An effective disclaimer will terminate the interest
given to the disclaiming party, and, if there is a future interest
in the property, the future interest will be accelerated, provided
there is no indication that the testator intended the interest not
to vest until the actual date of the death of the disclaiming
party. 46 Similarly, when a surviving spouse renounces a will,
any future interest which is to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the termination of an estate or other interest
given by the will to the surviving spouse shall take effect as
though the surviving spouse had predeceased the testator, unless
the will expressly provides that in case of renunciation such
future interests shall not be accelerated. Under section 2-8(c),
any future interest may be accelerated whether it is vested,
vested subject to divestiture or contingent.4 7 The doctrine of
at or after the termination of an estate or other interest given by

the will to the surviving spouse takes effect as though the surviving

spouse had predeceased the testator, unless the will expressly provides that in case of renunciation the future interest shall not be
accelerated.
43. Probate Act of 1975 § 2-8(d), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-8(d) (1975)
(formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 50 (1939)). JAMES, ILLINOIS PROBATE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 50.1 (Supp. 1977).
44. A disclaimer is defined as a formal mode of expressing a grantee's
dissent to the conveyance of property before the title has become vested
in him. The object of a disclaimer is to prevent an estate passing from
the grantor to the grantee. See Watson v. Watson, 13 Conn. 83 (1839);
Kinne v. Beebe, 6 Conn. 494 (1827); Jackson v. French, N.Y., 3 Wend.
337, 20 Am. Dec. 699 (1829).
45. Probate Act of 1975 § 2-7(e), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-7(e) (1975)
(formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 15b-15d (1939)).
46. In re Estate of Aylsworth, 74 Ill. App. 2d 375, 219 N.E.2d 779
(1966).
47. Prior to the enactment of the predecessor of § 2-8(c), vested remainders could be accelerated on renunciation, see Danz v. Danz, 373
Ill. 482, 26 N.E.2d 872 (1940); Kern v. Kern, 293 Ill. 238, 127 N.E. 396
(1920); Sherman v. Flack, 283 Ill. 457, 119 N.E. 293 (1918); Kane v.
Schofield, 332 Ill. App. 505, 76 N.E.2d 216 (1947); Cravens v. Haas, 318
Ill. App. 447, 48 N.E.2d 611 (1943), while contingent remainders could not
be accelerated, see Campbell v. Campbell, 380 Ill. 22, 42 N.E.2d 547
(1942); Sueske v. Schofield, 376 Ill. 431, 34 N.E.2d 399 (1941). Pursuant
to § 2-8(c), however, vested, vested subject to divestiture and contingent
future interests can be accelerated unless the testator expresses an intention to the contrary.
Even though § 2-8(c) sets up a simple rule regarding the accelera-
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acceleration of remainders is based on the proposition that although the ultimate bequest is, according to its terms, not to
take effect in possession until the death of the life tenant, it
should be read so as to take effect on any event which removes
the prior estate. The underlying presumption is that the testator
intended that the remainderman should take on the failure of
the previous estate, notwithstanding the fact that the prior donee
is still alive.48
When drafting a will, an attorney should call his client's
attention to the possible effects of a disclaimer by a beneficiary
or of a renunciation by a surviving spouse. 49 It would be advisable to include a specific clause in the will which sets forth
the testator's wishes in the event of a disclaimer or renunciation.
Such a provision should provide for alternate beneficiaries. 50 In
like manner, if the testator does not want the future interests
given under his instrument to vest prematurely, a clause could
tion of future interests, it may in actuality defeat the testator's intention
in certain situations, since it allows the court no discretion in determining
what the testator's intention would have been if he had planned for the
possibility of renunciation. For example, if the testator intended that
a contingent remainderman should not take unless he actually survives
the renouncing life tenant, § 2-8(c) would defeat this intention. See
Schuyler, Failure of Preceding Interests-Acceleration,50 Nw. U.L. REv.
485, 489 (1955).
48. Sherman v. Flask, 283 Ill. 457, 119 N.E. 293 (1918). See also
Danz v. Danz, 373 Ill. 482, 26 N.E.2d 872 (1940) (Under a will which devised property to widow for so long as she remain unmarried and created
vested remainders, renunciation by the widow accelerated the vested remainders.); Kern v. Kern, 293 Ill. 238, 127 N.E. 396 (1920) (Property
was devised to widow for use during her widowhood, with vested remainders over to her children. The court determined that the widow's
renunciation worked an extinguishment of her life estate and accelerated
the remaindermen's interests.); Northern Trust Co. v. Wheaton, 249 Ill.
606, 94 N.E. 980 (1911) (The testator put property in trust for the life
of his wife and sister or the survivor of them, with the remainder to
be distributed to certain named people at the end of said period. The,
court held that upon the renunciation by the widow, the remaindermen
whose interests had become vested at testator's death, become entitled
to enjoyment of the property upon the sister's death); Kane v. Schofield,
332 Ill. App. 505, 76 N.E.2d 216 (1947) (The court found that where
widow renounced the will, the fact that the remainder interests were
contingent was not controlling since in absence of testamentary intent
that remainderman take only at widow's death, renunciation puts life
estate out of the way and remainder takes effect.).
49. Schuyler, Failure of Preceding Interests-Acceleration, 50 Nw.
U.L. REv. 485, 490 (1955).
50. In regards to disclaimer the clause could provide:
If, for any reason, Beneficiary A decides to and does disclaim his
interest given under this will, I hereby give and devise said interest
to Beneficiary B.
2 J. MURPHY, MURPHY'S WILL CLAUSES Form 14:40 at 568 (1975).
In regards to renunciation, the clause would read as follows:
Should [spouse] renounce this will and elect to take the share of
a surviving spouse in the deceased [spouse's] estate, under the laws
of inheritance of the state of my domicile at the time of my death,
I then give, devise and bequeath all of my property to
9A R. HOBBEr, K. SIMON & E. SMITH, NICHOLS CYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL FORMS
§ 9.1238 (rev. 1977).
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be drafted which states when the future interests are to vest.
With respect to renunciation the most effective type of provision
which would prevent the interests' acceleration would use the
language of section 2-8 (c), "that in case of renunciation future
interests shall not be accelerated." 5' 1
SECTION 3-1-SIMULTANEOUS DEATHS

Section 3-1 of the Probate Act enacted the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act into law in Illinois.52 It provides for the distribution of property, the devolution of which is dependent upon
priority of death, in the event there is insufficient evidence 3 that
the persons died other than simultaneously. Section 3-1 (a) provides that the property of persons, when there is insufficient evidence that they have died other than simultaneously, must be
disposed of as if each person had survived. The statutory provision does not apply, however, when a will or other governing
instrument provides for the distribution of the property in a
different manner.
There are three types of clauses, differing in application, that
54
a draftsman can use when avoidance of the statute is desired.
The simultaneous death clause applies only when there is insufficient evidence that the deaths were other than simultaneously.
It does not matter that the deaths were due to different causes
or occurred at different places. In states which have adopted
the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, the inclusion of such a
clause in a will is not essential if the testator desires the property
to pass as if the beneficiary died first, but it may be used to
unequivocally inform the court of the testator's desired disposition of his estate in the event of simultaneous death. 55 The testator may also use the simultaneous death clause to negate the
51. Schuyler, Failure of Preceding Interests-Acceleration, 50 Nw.
U.L. REv. 485, 490 (1955).
52. Probate Act of 1975 §§ 3-1, 3-2, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 3-1, 3-2
See ILL.
(1975) (formerly ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 41a-41f (1939)).

ANN. STAT. ch. 3, art. IIA (Smith-Hurd 1976) (list of states which have
adopted the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act).
53. The term "sufficient evidence" in the Uniform Simultaneous
Death Act means that proof which would be necessary to constitute a
preponderance of the evidence. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Spain, 339 Ill. App.
476, 90 N.E.2d 256 (1950); Note, Evidence-Weight -and Sufficiency, 28
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 375 (1950).

54. McLucas, Drafting a "Simple" Will, 39 ILL. B.J. 78 (1950); E. BEL§§ 10130-10139 (1968).

SHEIM, MODERN LEGAL FORMS

55. MODERN LEGAL FORMS, supra note 54, at § 10130 n.15.

A simul-

taneous death clause provides as follows:
In the event that any beneficiary under this will and I shall die
under such circumstances that there is no sufficient evidence that
we died otherwise than simultaneously, such beneficiary shall be
deemed to have Dredeceased me.
MODERN LEGAL FORMS, supra note 54, at § 10130.
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effect of the Act and provide that the property shall pass as
though he predeceased the beneficiary.5
However, it should be
noted that to negating the Act results in burdening the asset with
the administration of two estates.
In contrast, the common disaster clause"7 determines which
of two or more parties should be deemed the survivor in case
of death resulting from a common disaster or accident. The
clause is effective even though the evidence shows who died first.
Even though there is positive proof that one spouse survived the
other, the clause is effective if they both died as a result of a
common disaster."8 The clause is applicable, however, only when
deaths occur as a result of violence or accident. Therefore,
should the deaths be simultaneous or within a relative short time
span of each other, the clause would be inapplicable if one party
died from natural causes.rl9
A survivorship clause 0 provides that the gift to the legatee
should be conditioned on the requirement that he survive the
testator for a stated period of time of relatively short duration,
such as sixty or ninety days. If the legatee fails to survive the
required period of time, the gift will descend to others, as provided in the will or by statute. It is applicable whether or not
the deaths are simultaneous or due to a common disaster.
The survivorship clause appears to be the most useful of these
clauses. It applies to many situations which cannot be provided
for by either the simultaneous death clause or the common disaster clause. Furthermore, it is applicable to all simultaneous
deaths and to most deaths resulting from a common disaster. The
56. In re Fowles' Will, 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (1918).

57. A common disaster clause reads as follows:
In the event that any beneficiary under this will and I shall die in
[or as the result of] a common disaster, I direct that this will shall
be construed as if such beneficiary had predeceased me.

supra note 54, at § 10132.
58. In re Estate of Messenger, 208 Kan. 763, 494 P.2d 1107 (1972)
(Where the husband's will provided that his wife be disinherited if they
both died at or about the same time as a result of a common disaster,
and both were pronounced dead at the scene of a car accident. The court
held it to be a valid clause, even though the wife had survived for a
short period of time.)
59. In re Davis' Estate, 186 Misc. 955, 61 N.Y.S.2d 427, aff'd 271 App.
Div. 970, 69 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1946) (Clause, which provided that if testator
and a beneficiary died in a common accident or disaster or under such
circumstances that it was doubtful which died first, then the will was to
take effect as if such beneficiary had predeceased the testator, had no
effect when testator and his wife died within one day's time from natural
causes unrelated to an accident or violence.)
60. A survivorship clause provides as follows:
In the event that any beneficiary under this will shall die within 30
days [or 60 days, or 90 days, etc.] after my death, such beneficiary
shall be deemed to have predeceased me, and I direct that the provisions of this will shall be construed upon that assumption.
MODERN LEGAL FORMS, supra note 54, at § 10135.
MODERN LEGAL FORMS,
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survivorship clause, therefore, has the broadest application of the
three clauses. A clause of even broader application could be
drafted by combining the survivorship clause with the common
disaster clause, presenting a fourth possible choice to the draftsman.

61

SECTION 4-11-ANTI-LAPSE STATUTE

The main purpose of the "anti-lapse" statute is to prevent
bequeathed property from passing intestate. It provides alternate
takers for certain categories of legacies to beneficiaries who predecease the testator. 62 The predeceased descendant's legacy
passes to his descendants. A legacy to a predeceased class member passes to the other members of the class, unless the deceased
member is a descendant of the testator which results in the
legacy passing to the deceased member's descendants per
stirpes. 63 The Act also provides that a legacy to any other
legatee who predeceases the testator will pass as part of the
64
residue to be taken proportionately by the residuary legatees.
In order for the testator to avoid the operation of the statute,
it must clearly appear from the will and the surrounding circum61. Shockett v. Silberman, 209 Va. 490, 165 S.E.2d 414 (1969) (Where
will provided that if the testator's wife should die with him "in a common
accident or disaster or under such circumstances as make it impossible

or difficult to determine which of us dies first or within ninety days

after my death" she should be conclusively deemed not to have survived
him.)
62. Anderson v. Anderson, 6 Ill. App. 2d 108, 112, 126 N.E.2d 726,
728 (1955).
63. Probate Act of 1975 § 4-11 (a) and (b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 4-11
(a) and (b) (1975) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 49 (1939)), which
provides:
Unless the testator expressly provides otherwise in his will, (a)
if a legacy of a present or future interest is to a descendant of the
testator who dies before or after the testator, the descendants of the
legatee living when the legacy is to take effect in possession or enjoyment, takes per stirpes the estate so bequeathed; (b) if a legacy
of a present or future interest is to a class, and any member of the
class dies before or after the testator, the members of the class living
when the legacy is to take effect in possession or enjoyment take
the share or shares which the deceased member would have taken
if he were then living, except that if the deceased member of the
class is a descendant of the testator, the descendants of the deceased
member then living shall take per stirpes the share or shares which
the deceased member would have taken if he were then living;
64. Probate Act of 1975 § 4-11(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 4-11(c)
(1975) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 49 (1939)), which provides:
except as above provided in (a) and (b), if a legacy lapses by
reason of the death of the legatee before the testator, the estate so
bequeathed shall be included in and pass as part of the residue under
the will, and if the legacy is or becomes part of the residue, the
estate so bequeathed shall pass to and be taken by the legatees or
those remaining, if any, of the residue in proportions and upon estates corresponding to their respective interests in the residue. The
provisions of (a) and (b) do not apply to a future interest which
is or becomes indefeasibly vested at the testator's death or at any
time thereafter before it takes effect in possession or enjoyment.
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stances that it was the intention of the testator, at the time he
executed his will, to provide for the contingency of the prior
death of the beneficiary. For the testator's intention to prevail,
it must be clear that he had the contingency in mind and that
he specifically provided for its occurrence. 5 It has been held
that the mere use of a phrase such as "to the survivors or survivor of them" in connection with a bequest is not sufficient to
avoid the operation of the statute. 66
A provision which was sufficiently specific to prevent the
operation of the anti-lapse statute was presented in Vollmer v.
McGowan."7 The clause in dispute stated:
In case any child above named should depart this life, either
with or without heirs of his or her body, at any time previous

to my demise, then and in that case, the. surviving children under this will shall become seized equally of the property specified of such deceased child or children so departing this life
aforesaid, and the property interest so accruing of such deceased child or children under this will. 68
The Supreme Court of Illinois held that this will disclosed an
unequivocal intent to disinherit children of any of his seven children who predeceased him. The court based its decision on the
fact that the testator's will clearly demonstrated that he anticipated the contingency of the death of a child prior to his own
death and provided for this contingency.6 9
In order to effectuate the testator's intention, whether he
plans to avoid the statute or to follow its outcome, it is necessary to use clear and precise language to demonstrate the testator's desired intention in the event that a beneficiary predeceases
him.70 The most effective provision would include a reference
to the contingency of death before setting forth the testator's
desired disposition should the contingency occur.
65. Vollmer v. McGowan, 409 Ill. 306, 312, 99 N.E.2d 337, 340 (1951).
66. Schneller v. Schneller, 356 Ill. 89, 93, 190 N.E. 121, 123 (1934).
67. 409 Ill. 306, 99 N.E.2d 337 (1951).
68. Id. at 309-10, 99 N.E.2d at 339.
69. Id. at 313, 99 N.E.2d at 340.
70. The testator may avoid the statute if he uses one of the following
provisions:
If for any reason any legacy or legacies left by this my will,
either pecuniary or residuary, shall lapse or fail, or for any reason
not take effect, either in whole or in part, I give and bequeath the
amount which shall lapse or fail, or not take effect, absolutely to
the persons hereinafter named as my executors.
In the event any legatee and/or person hereinbefore mentioned
as recipients under and by the terms of this will predecease me,
then and in that event, such bequest or bequests hereinbefore made
to such person or persons shall lapse and become void, and the same
shall become, part of the residuary of my estate and pass in accordance with the terms of this will disposing of such residuary.
2 J. MURPHY, MURPHY'S WILL CLAUSES Forms 14:38 and 14:39 at 567
(1975).
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SECTION

24-3 (b) -ORDER OF ABATEMENT

If the testator's estate is insufficient to pay all legacies,
section 24-3(b) provides that unless the will directs otherwise,
specific legacies are to be satisfied before general legacies, and
general legacies are to be satisfied pro rata, without any priority
between realty and personalty. 1 The testator who anticipates
a deficiency in his estate may direct the order of abatement so
that it conforms with his preferences among legatees or particular legacies. In the event of a deficiency in the estate, the testator's direction will be followed by the courts provided that his
preferences are set forth in a manner "beyond dispute." Absent
such a direction by the testator in his will, the statute will operate first to the detriment of general legacies which will abate
2
pro rata1
The courts operate upon the general presumption that the
testator believed his estate would be sufficient to satisfy his testamentary dispositions.7 3 Therefore, an intention contrary to the
statute will not be derived from mere inferences but will be
found only if the will clearly provides for an alternate scheme.74
In the case of In re Estate of Fleer,75 the petitioners contended
that the testamentary scheme of the testator's will manifested
an intent to prefer the natural objects of his bounty over charitable institutions. They argued that this intention was evidenced
by the order and manner in which the bequests were made and
by the use of endearing terms in references to the relatives in
the will. The court found that the statute controlled the order
of abatement because the will did not clearly provide for an alternate scheme. Therefore, all the general legacies, whether to
76
relation or institution, would suffer pro rata.
71. Probate Act of 1975 § 24-3(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 24-3(b)
(1975) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 291 (b) (1939)), which provides:
Unless otherwise provided by the will, if the estate of a testator
is insufficient to pay all legacies under his will, specific legacies shall
be satisfied pro rata before general legacies, and general legacies
shall be satisfied pro rata, without any priority in either case as between real and personal estate.
72. In re Estate of Fleer, 21 Ill. App. 3d 56, 59-60, 315 N.E.2d 260,
262 (1974); In re Estate of McDonald, 314 Ill. App. 148, 151.-52, 41 N.E.2d
128, 131-32 (1942).
73. In re Estate of Fleer, 21 Ill. App. 3d 56, 59, 315 N.E.2d 260, 262
(1974); In re Estate of McDonald, 314 Ill. App. 148, 151, 41 N.E.2d 128,
130 (1942).

74. See In re Estate of Fleer, 21 Ill. App. 3d 56, 59-60, 315 N.E.2d

260; 262 (1974).

75. 21 Ill. App. 3d 56, 315 N.E.2d 260 (1974).

76. Id. at 60, 315 N.E.2d at 262. But see Moody Bible Inst. v. Pettibone, 289 Ill. App. 69, 81, 6 N.E.2d 676, 682 (1937), which states that
as a general rule, legacies to otherwise unprovided relatives are given
preference over legacies to strangers. The court in In re Estate of Fleer
cited Moody but found it to be unpersuasive.
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There are a number of ways in which the testator's preference in regards to abatement can be expressed clearly and easily.
The draftsman can list the legacies in the order in which they
are to be satisfied and direct that they are to be satisfied in the
order in which they appear in the will.7" A scheme for abatement could be based on the status of the legatee.7 8 It is also
possible to draft a provision for abatement which is dependent
upon the value of the estate.7 1 Whatever approach is used, it
should be made clear that the testator is providing an alternate
scheme in lieu of the statutory provision.
SECTION 20-19-EXONERATION OF ENCUMBRANCES

Any real estate, leasehold estate or beneficial trust interest
subject to an encumbrance is taken by the recipient subject to
that encumbrance and is not entitled to exoneration of the indebtedness from the decedent's estate, unless the testator has
provided to the contrary. 0 If the representative pays any part
of the indebtedness from assets other than those subject to the
debt, the estate is entitled to reimbursement from the recipient
77. In case my estate should prove insufficient to pay all the pecuniary legacies in full, I direct that they shall be paid in full in the
order in which they are stated in this Will.
MODERN LEGAL FORMS, supra note 54, at § 9909.
78. In case my estate should prove insufficient for the payment of
all the pecuniary legacies and bequests herein given, I direct them
to apply my estate, first, to the payment in full of the legacies given
to my relations; second, to the payment of the legacies given to other
individuals; and third, to the payment of legacies and devises to institutions and corporations in such proportions as the residue divided
pro rata shall suffice for; and this direction is to apply as well to
all those legacies given in trust, it being my wish that individuals
shall be fully paid, and that all institutions and corporations named
herein should be paid pro rata from my estate in case of insufficiency.
MODERN LEGAL FORMS, supra note 54, at § 9910.
79. I expressly declare that the legacies to charities made in the
preceding paragraph of this Will shall be paid in full only in case
my total estate, as valued by my executors, shall amount to
dollars, and in case my estate shall be valued by my executors at
less than dollars, then said legacies shall abate proportionately.
MODERN LEGAL FORMS, supra note 54, at § 9911.
80. Probate Act of 1975 § 20-19(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 20-19(a)
(1975) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 219b (1939)), which provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by decedent's will:
(a) When any real estate or leasehold estate in real estate subject to an encumbrance, or any beneficial interest under a trust of
real estate or leasehold estate in real estate subject to an encumbrance, is specifically bequeathed or passes by joint tenancy with
right of survivorship or by the terms of a trust agreement or other
nontestamentary instrument, the legatee, surviving tenant or benefisiary to whom the real estate, leasehold estate or beneficial interest
is given or passes, takes it subject to the encumbrance and is not
entitled to have the indebtedness paid from other real or personal
estate of the decedent.
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of the encumbered property."' However, if the indebtedness extends to other property, the reimbursement is limited to the portion of the amound paid by the representative in the same
proportion which the value of the recipient's encumbered property bears to the total value of all the encumbered property. 2
This section eliminated the doctrine of exoneration which required the discharge of a lien against specifically devised real
estate by placing the burden of exoneration on the testator's
83
personal estate.
The statute requires an express provision in the decedent's
will to overcome its effect. To provide for exoneration, however,
the will must provide for more than the mere payment of the
testator's debts.8 4 An express provision for the payment of the
encumbrance is required. Furthermore, in the process of drafting testamentary provisions regarding the exoneration of encumbrances, it is important for the draftsman to correctly ascertain
the testator's intentions. The testator may unintentionally favor
one legatee over another by bequeathing property of equal value
to each, if one parcel is subject to a larger mortgage than the
other parcel.8 5
SECTION

18-14-CLAIMS

CHARGEABLE

AGAINST

THE

ESTATE

Section 18-14 provides that the decedent's realty and personalty and the income therefrom are chargeable without
distinction with the claims against the estate, the expenses of
administration, and estate and inheritance taxes and legacies, unless otherwise provided in the Act or by decedent's will. There
is to be no priority between realty and personalty in the deter81. Probate Act of 1975 § 20-19(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 20-19(b)
(1975) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 219b (1939)), which provides:
If the representative pays all or any part of the indebtedness
from assets other than the real estate, leasehold estate or beneficial

interest or the income or proceeds therefrom, he is entitled to reimbursement from the legatee, surviving tenant or beneficiary and, in
the event of nonreimbursement, the court may adjudge a lien on
the real estate, leasehold estate or beneficial interest for the amount
so paid with interest.
82. Probate Act of 1975 § 20-19(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 20-19(c)
(1975) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 219b (1939)), which provides:
If the encumbrance embraces or extends to other property, the
reimbursement shall be limited to the portion of the amount paid
by the representative which the value of the real estate, leasehold
interest or beneficial interest bears to the value of all property subject to the encumbrance as of the date of the decedent's death.
83. Doctrine of Exoneration of Encumbered Real Estate is Abolished,
56 ILL. B.J. 208, 214-15 (1967).
84. Id. at 215.
85. See Martin v. Martin, 310 Ill. App. 622, 3 N.E.2d 560 (1941)
(Where each devisee was required to bear the burden of the mortgage
indebtedness on land devised to him. The indebtedness could not be
prorated or equalized, in spite of the fact that one devisee received more
land which was much less heavily encumbered than the others).
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mination of what is to be leased, sold, mortgaged or pledged in
order to satisfy the claims, expenses and legacies against the
estate.80 The statutory provision destroys the former rule that
the personal estate of a deceased person was the primary asset
for the payment of debts and legacies unless a contrary intention, either express or implied, appeared in the will.87
Even though there are no recent decisions under the new
rule, courts have dealt with the issue of contrary will intent
under the former rule. In Hartman v. Meier,8 s the testator bequeathed $20,000 in cash to his daughter and made this bequest
"a charge and lien upon all my farm real and farm personal property. ' '8 9 The court, recognizing that the former general rule
required legacies to be paid out of the personal property of an
estate, stated that the testator's intention must be the controlling
factor in the construction of a will. Accordingly, the court determined that the testator clearly intended to make the legacies
a charge upon the farm land which had been specifically devised
90
to his son.
Although the former general rule that the personal estate
must be exhausted before resort can be made to the realty is
no longer applicable in the administration of an estate, the personal estate will generally continue, as a practical matter, to be
used first in satisfying all debts, expenses and legacies.9 ' For
this reason, it is necessary, notwithstanding the provisions of section 18-14, to clearly manifest the testator's intention if he wishes
92
to make the debts, expenses or legacies charges upon his realty.
86. Probate Act of 1975 § 18-14, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 18-14 (1975)
(formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3. § 207 (1939)), which provides:

All the real and personal estate of the decedent and the income

therefrom during the period of administration are chargeable with
the claims against the estate, expenses of administration, estate and
inheritance taxes and legacies without distinction except as otherwise provided in this Act or by decedent's will and may be leased,
sold, mortgaged or pledged as the court directs in the manner prescribed in this Act. In determining what property in the estate shall
be leased, sold, mortgaged or pledged for any purpose provided in
this Section, there is no priority as between real and personal estate,
except as provided in this Act or by decedent's will.
87. Reid v. Corrigan, 143 Ill. 402, 405, 32 N.E. 387, 387 (1892); Suiter
v. Suiter, 311 Ill. App. 618, 621, 37 N.E.2d 561, 562 (1941); In re Estate
of Riddel 247 Ill. App. 175, 180 (1928); Boue v. Kelsey, 53 Ill. App. 295,
297 (1894); Truett Sons & Morgan v. Cummons, 6 Ill. App. 73, 76 (1880).
88. 34 Ill. App. 2d 239, 181 N.E.2d 211 (1962).
89. Id. at 241, 181 N.E.2d at 213.
90. Id. at 247-48, 181 N.E.2d at 216.
91. H. WILLIAMS & J. HAUGHEY, HORNER PROBATE PRACTICE AND ESTATES § 469 (Supp. 1976).
92. The testator could provide as follows:
All debts and charges of my estate, including death taxes, secured obligations, expenses of administration, and taxes resulting
from joint tenancy, life insurance proceeds, and property subject to
a power of appointment are to be paid from the proceeds of those
life insurance policies which are payable to my estate. If such pro-
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SECTION 19-1-ADMINISTRATION OF PERSONAL ESTATE

A representative, pursuant to court order, may lease, sell,
mortgage or pledge the personal estate of the decedent when it
is necessary for the administration of the estate. Before leasing,
selling, mortgaging or pledging any of the personal assets, the
representative must file a petition with the court stating the facts
and circumstances of the transaction. 3 The court has the right
to determine whether the sale shall be public or private 4 These
provisions of the Probate Act do not apply to leases, sales,
mortgages or pledges made under a power given in the will.9 5
However, personal property selected by the surviving spouse or
child or specifically bequeathed or directed by the testator not
to be sold may not be sold, mortgaged or pledged unless necessary
for the payment of claims, expenses or taxes. 96
ceeds are insufficient, as many United States savings bonds as are
needed are to be cashed and those funds used to pay such debts.

No reimbursement will be required from anyone who, in the absence
of this paragraph, would have been primarily liable for payment

of such debts, taxes and expenses.

O'BYRNE &
(1969).
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93. Probate Act of 1975 § 19-4,

ILL. REV. STAT.

§ 3D0.3

ch. 3, § 19-4 (1975)

(formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 210 (1939)).
94. Probate Act of 1975 § 19-5, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 19-5 (1975)
(formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 211-212 (1939)).
95. Probate Act of 1975 § 19-1(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 19-1(c)
(1975) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 213.1 (1939)), which provides:
The provisions of this Article for the lease, sale, mortgage or
pledge of personal estate do not apply to leases, sales, mortgages
or pledges made without order of court by a representative under
a power given in the will. The lease, sale, mortgage or pledge of
any personal estate by a representative under a power given in a
will is valid regardless of the subsequent setting aside of the will
or any other action which might limit or restrain the right of the
representative, to transfer title or to lease, sell, mortgage or pledge
such personal estate. A lessee, purchaser, mortgagee or pledgee
from a representative under a power in a will obtains the same title
or interest as though the instrument were executed by the decedent
immediately prior to his death and the rights and claims of all parties claiming under or through the decedent shall be transferred to
the consideration received or to be received from the lease, sale,
mortgage or pledge.
96. Probate Act of 1975 § 19-1(a) and (b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 191 (a) and (b) (1975) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 209 and 213.1
(1939)), which provides:
(a) By leave of court, a representative may lease, sell, mortgage
or pledge the personal estate of the decedent when it is necessary
for the proper administration of the estate. Personal property selected by the surviving spouse or child or specifically bequeathed
or directed by the testator not to be sold may not be sold, mortgaged
or pledged unless necessary for the payment of claims, expenses of
administration, estate or inheritance taxes or the proper administration of the estate.
(b) If the sale of the personal estate is not necessary for the
payment of claims or expense of administration or the proper distribution of the estate, the court may order the personal estate to be
distributed in kind.
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The power of the representative to sell, mortgage or pledge
personal property may be found in the will either by an express
grant or by implication. In either event, the testator's intention
"must be carried out if it violates no rule of law. ' 97 Where a
will provides for the division of the testator's estate into a
definite number of shares with distribution to be made in stated
portions by the executor, the courts have found an implied power
in the executor to sell both the real and personal property.9 8
An express power has been found to exist where the will provided in effect that all the rest, residue and remainder of the
estate, both real and personal, of whatsoever kind and character
should be sold and distributed in equal shares. 99
If the testator intends that his representative is to have the
power to sell, lease or mortgage his personal property this intention should be clearly demonstrated by the language chosen by
the draftsman. If the testator does not want certain property
to be sold, mortgaged or leased, it would be beneficial for the
draftsman to include a detailed description of the property which
is to be left intact, since an implied power to sell may unexpectedly be found in the will. 10 0
SECTION 20-15-POWER TO LEASE, SELL
OR MORTGAGE REAL ESTATE

Section 20-15 provides that the provisions of the Probate Act
regarding the lease, sale or mortgage of real estate, by a repre97. Knight v. Gregory, 333 Ill. 643, 645, 165 N.E. 208, 209 (1929).
98. Id. at 648, 165 N.E. at 210.
99, Schroeder v. Benz, 9 Ill. 2d 589, 138 N.E.2d 496 (1956) (Where
the testatrix gave, devised and bequeathed to her brothers and sisters
and to children of her deceased brother, all the rest, residue and remainder of her estate, both real and personal, to be sold and distributed
in equal shares, share and share alike, the court found the executor had
power to sell the property to effectuate the testatrix's intention).
100. A power to sell could provide:
I authorize and empower my executors or the survivor of them,
or the executors or executor for the time being of this my Will, if
and whenever in the settlement of my estate they shall deem it advisable, to sell at private or public sale at such price as they shall
think fit the whole or any part of my real and personal estate, and
to execute good and sufficient deeds and other instruments necessary
or proper to convey and transfer the same to the purchasers, who
shall not be bound to see to the application of the purchase money.
MODERN LEGAL FORMS, supra note 54, at § 9811.
A power to mortgage could provide:
I authorize and empower my executors or the survivor of them,
or the executors or executor for the time being of this my Will, if
and whenever in the settlement of my estate they shall deem it advisable, to mortgage upon such terms and conditions as they may
think fit all or any part of my real estate, and I declare that no
mortgagee shall be bound to see to its application of any money
raised thereby.
MODERN LEGAL FORMS, supra note 54, at § 9812.
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sentative do not apply to leases, sales or mortgages made by the
representative under a power given in the will. 10 1 Absent such
power, the representative must comply with various provisions
in the Probate Act which subject the sale of real estate to court
supervision. For example, before selling or mortgaging real
estate, the representative must file a petition with the court
setting forth all the facts and circumstances of the transaction,
the description and value of the property, and the nature and
extent of all liens upon the property. All persons having an
interest in the property are required by the Act to be made
parties defendant.10 2 If the testator believes that these protections are unnecessary and desires to minimize the costs of administration, 'then he may grant broad or specific powers to his
representative, making it unnecessary to comply with these provisions which would incur additional fees.
In order to determine the extent of the power, the intention
of the testator must be gathered from the will's language. 10 3 The
power to sell, lease or mortgage may be either expressly1 04 or
impliedly 0 5 conferred. Since a determination of the executor's
101. Probate Act of 1975 § 20-15, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 20-15 (1975)
(formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 246 (1939)), which provides in part:

The provisions of this Article for the lease, sale or mortgage of real
estate or interest therein do not apply to leases, sales or mortgages
made without order of court by a representative under a power given
in the will, but before making a sale or mortgage of real estate it
is the duty of the representative to execute, file in and have approved by the court which issued letters of office to him a bond
as provided in Section 12-9.
102. Probate Act of 1975 § 20-5, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 20-5 (1975)
(formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 227, 229-233 (1939)). See also Probate
Act of 1975 §§ 20-2 to 20-9, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 20-2 to 20-9 (1975)
(formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 220-222, 224-226, 234-237 and 239
(1939)).
103. Pope v. Kitchell, 354 Ill. 248, 256, 188 N.E. 451, 454 (1933); Heyne
v. Scheffauer, 321 Ill. 266, 272, 151 N.E. 893, 895 (1926).
104. See Schroeder v. Benz, 9 Ill. 2d 589, 138 N.E.2d 496 (1956) (Where
the will provided that "all the rest, residue and remainder of his estate
both real and personal of whatsoever kind and character and wherever
situated should be sold and distributed in equal share, share and share
alike," the court held it expressly provided for the sale of the property);
Heyne v. Scheffauer, 321 Ill. 266, 151 N.E. 893 (1926) (Where the executor
was given "full power and authority to sell, mortgage and convey" the
whole estate and "to compound and settle any and all claims in favor of
or against the estate," the court decided the testator had vested broad
powers and ample discretion in the executor, since the language did not
limit the sale to the purpose of paying claims and legacies); In re Estate
of Link, 132 Ill. App. 2d 893, 895-96, 271 N.E.2d 393, 394-95 (1971) (The
appellate court held that, under a provision of the will giving executor
the power to sell "all or any part" of the real estate, testator provided
broad and independent power of sale to executor not only to pay legacies
and debts but also, in the absolute discretion of executor, to accomplish
any other purpose).
105. See Grove v. Willard, 280 Ill. 247, 117 N.E. 489 (1917) (Where
a will had no provision for the payment of debts which exceeded the
value of the personal property, and the widow was given control over
the personal property and real estate with the power to sell or dispose
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powers depends on the court's interpretation of the language employed by the testator, it would be advisable for the draftsman
to use very clear and precise terms. There are a variety of
methods by which the testator can grant this authority to his
representative-by separate grants of power, such as, the power
to sell, the power to mortgage or the power to pay debts, or
by a single grant of authority encompassing the separate
powers. 10 6
SECTION 20-1-ADMINISTRATION OF REAL ESTATE

The Probate Act in section 20-1 provides that unless the
testator expresses a contrary intention in his will or the statute
provides otherwise, the representative is to take possession of all
real estate during the administration of the estate." 7 However,
he cannot take possession of real estate used by an heir or legatee
as a residence, unless directed by the testator to do so, or unless
the court finds that possession is necessary in order to pay claims
against the estate, expenses of administration or taxes. 08 While
of the property as she thought best, the court believed that the language
of the will inferred that all the real estate and personalty should be sold
by the widow).
106. An example of a power to sell would provide:
I authorize and empower my executors or the survivor of them,
or the executors or executor for the time being of this my Will, if
and whenever in the settlement of my estate they shall deem it advisable, to sell at private or public sale at such price as they think
fit the whole or any part of my real and personal estate, and to
execute good and sufficient deeds and other instruments necessary
or proper to convey and transfer the same to the purchasers, who
shall not be bound to see to the application of the purchase money.
An example of a power to mortgage reads as follows:
I authorize and empower my executors or the survivor of them,
or the executors or executor for the time being of this my Will, if
and whenever in the settlement of my estate they shall deem it advisable, to mortgage upon such terms and conditions as they may
think fit all or any part of my real estate, and I declare that no
mortgagee shall be bound to see to its application of any money
raised thereby.
MODERN LEGAL FORMS, supra note 54, at §§ 9811, 9812.
107. Probate Act of 1975 § 20-1(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 20-1 (a)
(1975) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 219a (1939)), which provides:
Except as otherwise provided by subsection (b) of this Section
or by decedent's will, every representative shall take possession, subject to the exempt estate of homestead, of all real estate of the decedent during the period of administration and, while retaining possession, (1) shall collect the rents and earnings therefrom, (2) shall
keep in tenantable repair the buildings and fixtures, (3) shall pay
the taxes, mortgages, and other liens thereon in accordance with
their terms, (4) may protect the real estate by insurance, (5) may
employ agents and custodians and (6) may make all reasonable expenditures necessary to preserve the real estate. He may maintain
an action for the possession of or to determine the title to real estate,
except that no action to determine the title to real estate may be
commenced without authorization of the court which issued his letters.
108. Probate Act of 1975 § 20-1(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 20-1(b)
(1975) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 219a (1939)), which provides:
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retaining possession of real estate, the representative has certain
duties and discretionary powers with respect to the property.
His mandatory duties include collecting rents, keeping the buildings and fixtures in tenable repair, and paying taxes, mortgages
and other liens. Protecting the real estate by insurance, employing agents and custodians and making expenditures to preserve
the property are the discretionary powers conferred upon the
representative.' 0 9 Because of the particular importance of insuring property, it may be advisable to direct that the executor is
to obtain insurance, rather than leave the matter to his discretion.
Prior to the enactment of this section the rule was that the
real estate of which a decedent died seized descended directly to
the heir or devisee, and no title or right of possession or interest
therein passed to an executor unless given to him by the will,
either expressly or by implication. 1 10 The Probate Act as
amended gives executors a new interest in the real estate of an
estate, but this change affects only the estates of persons dying
after July 1, 1965.111 Therefore, if the testator wants the real
estate to pass directly to the beneficiary upon his death, it is important to state this intention in the will in clear and unambigu112
ous language.
SECTION 19-6-CONTINUATION OF DECEDENT'S BUSINESS

As a general rule, the personal representative of a testator
The representative may not take possession of real estate or the portion thereof occupied by the heir or legatee thereof as his residence
unless otherwise provided by the decedent's will or unless the court
at any time finds that possession is necessary for the payment of
claims, expenses of administration, estate or inheritance taxes or legacies, the preservation of the real estate, or any part thereof, or the
proper distribution of the estate.
109. Probate Act of 1975 § 20-1(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 20-1 (a)
(1975) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 219a (1939)).
110. In re Estate of English, 24 Ill. 2d 357, 358-59, 181 N.E.2d 111, 112
(1962) (administrator was not entitled to notice in tax deed proceedings); Dell v. Herman, 365 Ill. 261, 265, 6 N.E.2d 159, 161 (1936) (executor takes only quantity of interest given under power of sale in the will);
McCarty v. McCarty, 356 Ill. 559, 561-62, 191 N.E. 68, 69, 94 A.L.R. 1137,
1139-40 (1934) (same).
111. Conway v. Hawthorn, Lane & Co., 101 Ill. App. 2d 1, 6, 241 N.E.2d
641, 644 (1968).
112. The testator may grant power to the representative to manage
the property in any manner the testator desires. For example,
My executor and trustee shall, in addition to other powers and
discretions granted by law or necessary or appropriate for proper
administration, have the following rights, powers and discretions,
without obtaining court permission or approval:
To manage real estate and personal property with all the rights and
powers as if individually owned.
O'BYRNE & MCCORD, DESKBOOK FOR ILLINOIS ESTATE PLANNERS § 4D4.12
(j) (1969).
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has no authority to continue the decedent's business.1" Section
19-6 allows the representative to continue the decedent's unincorporated business for one month following the issuance of his
114
letters or for such time as the court may authorize.
The Probate Act imposes certain burdens on the representative who is operating the decedent's business under court
authority. The representative must file monthly reports with
the court setting forth such items as receipts and disbursements
for the month.' 1 5 The testator may circumvent these costly statutory burdens by expressly authorizing his representative to continue the operation of his business. Even though the testator's
intention will usually be carried out, the court has the option
to acquire supervision over the business if the representative
operates it in a manner disadvantageous to the estate.""
It is important that the draftsman, while ascertaining his
client's testamentary scheme, have his client consider the personal liability of his representative for losses incurred in the
operation of his business during the administration of his estate.
The Probate Act provides that the representative will be liable
only for losses caused by his malfeasance

or misfeasance.117

113. See Nonnast v. Northern Trust Co., 374 Ill. 248, 259, 29 N.E.2d
251, 258 (1940); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Corporation of Fine Arts
Bldg., 288 Ill. 142, 149, 123 N.E. 300, 302 (1919); Grace v. Seibert, 235
Ill. 190, 193, 85 N.E. 308, 309 (1909).
114. Probate Act of 1975 § 19-6(a) ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 19-6(a)
(1975) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 213a (1939)), which provides:
Except as otherwise directed by the decedent in his will or except as otherwise provided by law, a representative has authority,
for the preservation and settlement of the estate of a decedent, to
continue the decedent's unincorporated business during one month
next following the date of issuance of his letters unless the court
directs otherwise, and for such further time as the court from time
to time may authorize, without personal liability except for malfeasance or misfeasance for losses incurred. The court may order such
notice of the time and place of the hearing on the petition to be
given to any interested persons as it deems expedient or the court
may hear the petition without notice. Obligations incurred or contracts entered into are entitled to priority of payment out of the assets of the business, but, without approval of the court first obtained,
do not involve the estate beyond these assets.
115. Probate Act of 1975 § 19-6(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 19-6(b)
(1975) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 213a (1939)), which provides:
During the time the business is so conducted, unless otherwise
ordered by the court, the representative shall file monthly reports
in the court, setting forth the receipts and disbursements of the business for the preceding month and such other pertinent information
as the court may require.
See Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Corporation of Fine Arts Bldg., 288
Ill. 142, 123 N.E. 300 (1919) (Where the executor was authorized to conduct decedent's business for sixty days, the court held that the lower
court did not intend to extend the executor's authority beyond sixty days
when the executor was ordered to sell part of decedent's personal property).
116. In re Estate of Szantay, 92 Ill. App. 2d 317, 324, 235 N.E.2d 861,
865 (1968).
117. Probate Act of 1975 § 19-6(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 19-6(a)
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Similarly, if the testator expressly authorizes the representative
to operate the business according to his own discretion, the common law provides that the representative will not be personally
liable in the absence of fraud or negligence. The representative
who is given a discretionary power has to exercise prudence in
118
managing the business to avoid liability.
Where a testator desires to have his business carried on until
distribution or liquidation, it is advisable to incorporate suitable
provisions in his will pertinent to the type of business interest
owned by the testator. If the testator is a sole proprietor, the
will should define exactly which assets constitute the business
and which funds may be used for business purposes.1 19 Obligations incurred or contracts entered into are entitled to priority
of payment out of the assets of the business, but do not involve the estate beyond those assets without prior court
approval.120 If the testator had a partnership interest, authority
could be granted for the representative to make a settlement
agreement with the surviving partners or to accept a certification
by the surviving partners as to the testator's partnership interest.
If the testator owns all or the controlling stock of a closely held
corporation, it would be wise to authorize the executor to hold
the investment regardless of the applicable trust rules. The will
could also authorize the retention of the stock despite losses into participate in the
curred and possibly authorize the executor
121
business.
the
of
conduct
management and
(1975) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 213a (1939)).
. 118. Compare In re Estate of Szantay, 92 Ill. App. 2d 317, 235 N.E.2d
861 (1968) (The court stated that where a testator expressly authorized
his representative to continue the business and allowed him to exercise
his own discretion in the business operation, the decisions of the representative were conclusive in the absence of fraud or negligence) with
In re Estate of Wenzlaff, 55 Ill. App. 2d 92, 204 N.E.2d 149 (1964) (abstract opinion) (The court held the administrator personally responsible
for losses sustained by jewelry business during period she operated business without court's permission).
119. See Moore v. McFall, 263 Ill. 596, 105 N.E. 723 (1914) (Where
the testator directed that his business should be continued and devised
all of his property to his wife, the court held all debts contracted by
the widow in connection with the business were charges upon the entire
estate, since the testator had not made clear an intention to distinguish
between his business assets and his other property).
120. Probate Act of 1975 § 19-6(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 19-6(a)
(1975) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 213a (139)).
121. Moore, Drafting Business Clauses, 43 ILL. B.J. 648, 649-50 (1955).
The following is a sample clause granting the representative power
to carry on a business:
I authorize my executors or executor for the time being to carry
now carried
on the whole or any part of the business of until such time as they shall deem it expedient
on by me at
to sell the same or to wind up the said business, as the case may
be, and to employ therein any capital which may be employed
therein at my death, and to augment or decrease the capital employed therein, and to appoint any person, including any one or more
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SECTION

4-15-DEBTOR AS EXECUTOR

Section 4-15 provides that the appointment of a debtor of
the testator as executor of his will does not extinguish any debt
due from the executor to the testator, unless the testator declares
in his will his intention to extinguish the debt and the testator's
estate is sufficient to discharge all claims without the collection
of the debt due from the executor. 1'2 2 At common law, the mere
appointment of the debtor as executor extinguished the debt,
however, a court of equity could compel payment of the debt
if the estate could not satisfy its creditors.'12
The logic underlying the common law rule allowing a court of equity to compel
payment if the estate was insolvent was that the debtor's indebtedness was considered paid to the executor at the time of
appointment but remained an asset in the executor's posses-

sion.'

24

Under the statute, the testator must expressly declare his
intention to relieve the executor of his liability to the estate.
That intention will be difficult to find if the debt was not in
existence at the time of the execution of the will and no reference is made to future debts. In Updike v. Tompkins,12 5 the
testatrix provided in her will that a $900 note held against her
brother was to be cancelled and further provided that "at my
26
death I want all other notes cancelled and surrendered.'
At the time of her death, the testatrix held six notes against
her brother, five of which were not in existence when the will
was written and executed. The court stated that the language
in the will could only cover notes in existence at the time of
the execution of the will and, therefore, notes subsequently made
were not cancelled.1' 7 For this reason, should a testator wish
of themselves, manager, or agent to act therein at a salary or otherwise, and generally to act in the premises as if they were absolute
owners thereof without being liable or responsible for any loss arising thereby, and, in case the same shall be carried on at a loss, I
declare that my executors shall be reimbursed for all losses so incurred by them out of my general estate.
MODERN LEGAL FORMS, supra note 54, at § 9817.
122. Probate Act of 1975 § 4-15, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 4-15 (1975)
(formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 52 (1939)), which provides:
The appointment of the debtor of the testator as executor of his
will does not extinguish any debt due from the executor to the testator, unless the testator in the will expressly declares his intention
to extinguish the debt and unless the estate of the testator without
collection of the debt due from the executor is sufficient to discharge
all claims against the testator's estate.
123. See Phillips v. Duckett, 112 Ill. App. 587 (1904).
124. See Wachsmuth v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 241 Ill. 409, 89
N.E. 787 (1909).
125. 100 Ill. 406 (1881).
126. Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 411.
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to extinguish debts owed him, including those which come into
existence after the execution of the will, it is necessary that his
intention be set forth unequivocally in the will. If that intention
is not originally expressed and new debts accrue after the signing
of the will, a codicil would be necessary to extinguish the subsequent debts.
SECTION 12-4-WAIVER OF SECURITY

The testator's intention will govern even in the area of
security for bonds which are required by Article XII of the Probate Act. Section 12-4 provides that no security is required of
a person who is excused by the will from giving bond or security
and that no greater security can be required than that specified
by the will, unless the court from its own knowledge or from
the suggestion of any interested person, has cause to suspect the
representative of fraud or incompetence or believes the estate
128
to be insufficient to discharge all claims.
It is important to note that when a testator excuses a person
from giving bond or security, this pardon applies only to the specific role stated in the will. If a person is to serve as executor
and trustee, and the will provides that the executor should serve
without bond, the person would still be required to post security
for bond in his role as trustee. 1211 Therefore, when the person
appointed executor is also to fill another role in the will, it is
iinportant to specifically exclude him from posting security for
bond in all of his roles provided that is the testator's intent. Although the problem of multiple roles should be kept in mind,
the draftsman may, in the usual circumstance, use a very simple

128.

Probate Act of 1975 § 12-4, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 12-4 (1975)

(formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 150 (1939)),

which provides:

Except as provided in Section 6-11 (c) with respect to a nonresident executor, no security is required of a person who is excused
by the will from giving bond or security and no greater security
than is specified by the will is required, unless in either case the
court, from its own knowledge or the suggestion of any interested
person, has cause to suspect him of fraud or incompetence or believes
that the estate of the decedent will not be sufficient to discharge
all the claims against the estate, or in the case of a testamentary
guardian of the estate, that the rights of the minor will be prejudiced
by failure to give security.
It is interesting to note that under § 12-4 the court may require security, if it suspects fraud or incompetence on the part of the representative
based on its own knowledge or from "the suggestion of any interested
person." Under prior law the court could require security based on the
"suggestions of creditors and legatees" only. Due to this change in langauge, § 12-4 enables the court to require security in a greater variety
of cases. See Wood v. Stewart, 120 Ill. App. 34 (1906).
129. Gahan v. Golden, 330 Ill. 624, 162 N.E. 164 (1928) (Widow required to give personal security as trustee, but not as executor).
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clause to excuse
bond.130

the executor from posting security for his

SECTION 21-1INVESTMENTS BY REPRESENTATIVE
Under section 21-1, the testator's representative has the right
to make investments in any one or more of the investments specified in sections 21-1.01 through 21-1.06 in addition to any investments authorized by the decedent in his will.13 1 If the testator
does not grant authority to the executor to make other invest132
ments, the executor is limited to those specified by the statute.
The authority granted by the testator may be very broad 3 3 or
it may be very limited.'3 4 What will be a prudent grant of power
130. A testator may provide for waiver of bond by utilizing the following clause:
I direct that he [or she, or they, or my said executors] be exempt from giving any [surety or sureties upon his (or her, or their)]
official bond[s].
MODERN LEGAL FORMS, supra note 54, at § 9765.
131. Probate Act of 1975 § 21-1, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 21-1 (1975)
(formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 257a (19395), which provides:
In addition to any investments which a decedent may authorize his
executor to make by the terms of his will, the representative of his
estate, in his discretion, may invest money of the estate of a decedent
in any one or more of the investments specified in Sections 21-1.01
through 21-1.06.
132. The representative would be limited to investments in:
(1) direct obligations of or guaranteed by the United States or any
instrumentality or agency of the United States, provided the maturity
date is less than 5 years from the date of purchase;
(2) certain obligations of a local public agency or a public housing
agency;
(3) savings accounts or certificates of deposit of a state or national
bank doing business in Illinois to the extent that the deposits are insured
by the United States or agency thereof;
(4) withdrawable accounts or shares of a state or federal savings
and loan association doing business in Illinois to the extent such accounts or shares are insured by the United States or agency thereof;
(5) interests in certain common trust funds; and
(6) any other investments authorized by a court or declared by the
legislature to be legal investments by representatives of decedent's estate.
Probate Act of 1975 §§ 21-1.01 to 21-1.06, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 211.01 to 21-1.06 (1975) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 257a(a)-(f)
(1939)).
133. The testator could provide:
I grant to my executors and trustees power to do everything
they deem advisable, even though it would not be authorized or appropriate for fiduciaries (but for this power) under any statutory
or other rule of law, including in this grant power (without impairing its plenary nature) to:
(1) acquire by purchase or otherwise, and retain, temporarily
or permanently, any kind of realty and personalty--even stocks and
unsecured obligations, undivided interests, interests in investment
trusts and discretionary common trust funds, property which produces much, little or no income, or which is wasting, or is outside
of my domicile or abroad-all without diversification as to kind or
amount.
MODERN LEGAL FORMS, supra note 54, at § 9781.
134. The testator could restrict his or her representative by granting:
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in most circumstances will largely depend upon the capacities
of the intended executor.
SECTION 19-12-NOMINEE REGISTRATION

Section 19-12 provides that a representative or his agent,
custodian or depositary may have stocks, bonds and other personal property of the estate registered and held in the name of
a nominee, unless the testator has otherwise provided in his will.
The representative is liable for the nominee's acts since the
ownership, possession and control of the property remains in the
representative.18 5
Legal title in and possession of the personal assets of the
testator's estate are generally acquired by the representative.''3
Due to this general principle, a representative is entitled to have
the stock of a decedent transferred to him in his representative
capacity on the books of a corporation.' 37 This rule is based on
the fact that the representative must be able to bring suit in
order to protect the'property interests of the estate.388
In the management of the property of my estate, I recommend
that my trustees invest and reinvest from time to time, as occasion
may offer, the moneys of said trust funds and the proceeds in notes
secured by first mortgages upon productive real estate, or in first
mortgage bonds of leading trunk lines of established railroads, which
are paying dividends on their stock, or in the bonds of cities or populous towns, counties or school districts not largely in debt, or in
bonds of any of the states of the Union, or in bonds of the United
States of America having always in view the largest income from
the estate consistent with the safe investment thereof. They may
also invest and reinvest the moneys of said trust fund in any securities eligible for investment by savings banks or trustees under the
laws of the.state of
-;
but I direct that no part of the moneys
of my estate shall be invested in the capital stock of any corporation,
nor in real estate; but nothing herein shall be construed to require
my executors or trustees to sell any corporate stock which I may
own at the time of my decease, unless it shall seem to them for
the interest of my estate so to do.
MODERN LEGAL FORMS, supra note 54, at § 9782.

135. Probate Act of 1975 § 19-12, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 19-12 (1975)

(formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 340b (1939)), which provides:
Unless otherwise provided by the will, a representative or his
agent, custodian or depositary may cause stocks, bonds and other
personal property of the estate to be registered and held in the name
of a nominee without mention of the fiduciary relationship in any
instrument or record constituting or evidencing title thereto. The
representative is liable for the acts of the nominee with respect to
any property so registered. The records of the representative shall
at all times show the ownership of the property. Any property so
registered shall be in the possession and control of the representative
and kept separate from his individual property.
136. Boghosian v. Mid-City Nat'l Bank, 25 Ill. App. 2d 455, 459, 167
N.E.2d 442, 444 (1960) (administrator).
See also Stoke v. Wheeler, 391
Ill. 429, 63 N.E.2d 492 (1945); Edwards v. Lane, 331 Ill. 442, 163 N.E.
460 (1928); McLean County Coal Co. v. Long, 91 Ill. 617, 619 (1879)
(executor).
137. Globe Slicing Mach. Co. v. Hasner, 333 F.2d 413, 415 (2d
Cir. 1964).
138. Bante v. Bante Dev. Co., 27 S.W.2d 481, 485 (1930); S. THOMPSON
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Nominee registration of securities usually occurs when they
are held in trust. Officers of a trust company may form a partnership for the sole purpose of holding title to the trust property. The securities will then be registered in the partnership
name with no mention of the trust. Under such registration,
the securities are more readily transferable. If they were
registered in the name of a trustee, the transfer could not be
completed until the authority of the trustee was established. 13 9
If the testator intends his stocks or bonds to be registered
in the name of a specific person, that intention should be expressly stated in the will. In all other cases the representative
will have the right to possession and control of the property even
though the property is to be distributed at some future time to
140
a specific legatee.
SECTION 6-12-SUCCESSOR-EXECUTORS
Unless otherwise provided by the will, if one of several executors named in the will fails or refuses to qualify, dies, resigns
or has his letters revoked, letters testamentary are to be issued
to the remaining executor who qualifies or accepts the office.
The remaining executor has all the powers vested in the executors
named in the will. If no successor-executor is named, then
letters are issued pursuant to section 9-3 which sets forth the
preferences for issuance of letters testamentary.14 ' In order to
provide for a successor-executor, the testator should use clear
& J. THOMPSON,
ed. White 1927).
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§ 4D4.12(j) (1969).
140. The testator may empower his or her representative to register
securities in a nominee in the following manner:
My executor and trustee shall, in addition to other powers and
discretions granted by law or necessary or appropriate for proper
administration, have the following rights, powers and discretions,
without obtaining court permission or approval: ...
To register securities in the name of a nominee.
Id.
141. Probate Act of 1975 § 6-12, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 6-12 (1975)
(formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 75-76 (1939)), which provides:
Unless otherwise provided by the will, (a) if one of several executors named in the will fails or refuses to qualify and accept the
office, letters testamentary shall be issued to the executor who qualifies and accepts the office, (b) if one of several executors to whom
letters have been issued dies or resigns or his letters are revoked,
the remaining executor shall continue to administer the estate, and
(c) in either event the remaining executor has-all powers vested
in all the executors named in the will. If no executor is named
in the will or the named executor fails or refuses to qualify and
accept the office or, if after letters are issued the sole executor or
all the named executors die or resign or their letters are revoked,
letters shall be issued in accordance with the preferences in Section
9-3.
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and unambiguous language. 142 The intention of the testator to
appoint successor-executors should be precisely stated in the
order in which they are to serve. 4 3
If the testator appoints an executor, as well as a successorexecutor, and grants the executor a special power, problems may

arise if the successor-executor assumes office after the original
executor has exercised the special power. In the case of In re
Estate of Lynch,114 the testator's brother, William, was appointed
as executor while the testator's brother, Richard, was appointed
as successor-executor. The testator bequeathed the residue of
his estate to William "for him to distribute amongst the other
heirs or retain as he in his own best judgment may decide," and
the successor-executor was empowered with the same powers
as given to the executor "including the distribution of the
residue.' 145 The court held, however, that the provision empowering Richard to act as successor-executor related merely to
his appointment of a successor-executor and did not constitute
a condition precedent to the distribution of the residue and that
the executor's distribution was binding on the estate.
If the testator empowers the executor with a power to distribute assets in his discretion and also designates a successorexecutor, it would be prudent, in the light of In re Estate of
Lynch, to clearly indicate that any exercise of the power by the
original executor is binding on the estate. Furthermore, in the
event that no person assumes the post of executor, a provision
for an alternate disposition of the assets subject to the special
power should be provided.
The use of ambiguous terms may also raise difficulties when
two or more executors are named to administer the estate in
concert rather than in succession. 146 Should one of the co-executors die, the question of whether the testator intended a joint
executorship may be presented, unless the intention is clearly
expressed. Under a joint executorship, both persons appointed
must be able to serve. If one person is disqualified or is in some
other manner unable to serve, an administrator with the will
annexed will be appointed by the court.
The question has arisen as to whether the use of the term
"co-executors" creates a joint executorship. In holding that the
142. See Kinney v. Keplinger, 172 Ill. 449, 50 N.E. 131 (1898) (Where
testator specifically provided for a successor-executor).
143. In re Estate of Lynch, 65 Ill. App. 2d 162, 212 N.E.2d 521 (1965).
144. Id. at 164, 212 N.E.2d at 522.
145. Id. at 164, 212 N.E.2d at 522-23.
146. In re Estate of Wolfner, 27 Ill. 2d 221, 188 N.E.2d 712 (1963)
(Where testator appointed her two sons as co-executors and one could
not serve, the court found that she intended the remaining son to act
as executor).
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term "co-executors" does not require the creation of a joint executorship, the Illinois Supreme Court relied heavily upon the
statutory provision requiring that the "remaining executor" shall
continue to administer the estate and has all powers vested in
all the executors named in the will. 1 47 Therefore, if a joint executorship is desired, a clear provision to that effect must be
provided.
SECTION 6-16-POWER OF THE
ADMINISTRATOR WITH THE WILL ANNEXED

Section 6-16 gives the administrator with the will annexed
all the powers and duties of the executor under the will unless
the will provides otherwise. This section, however, does not excuse the administrator from providing security for his bond. 148
It is important that this provision be kept in mind if the
testator empowers his executor with special powers, since the
executor may fail to qualify, refuse to undertake the office, or
die. If these special powers are based on the named executor's
personal expertise or experience the testator may not intend for
another to exercise them. The testator may also grant special
powers to the executor, because of personal qualities such as
honesty, trustworthiness, and the like. Therefore, the testator
should be made aware that in the event an administrator with
the will annexed is appointed, the administrator will exercise the
same powers granted to the executor unless a provision is made
to the contrary. Depending on the testator's intention, the
draftsman may provide that an administrator with the will
annexed is not empowered with the same powers as granted to
149
the executor.
CONCLUSION

Judicial interpretation of ambiguous provisions in a will may
147. An example clause for the appointment of a successor-executor
would provide:

I appoint my wife,

, executrix of this Will. If, however,

she should predecease me or should fail to qualify, or having qualified, should die, resign, or become incapacitated during the period
of administration of my estate, I appoint my son,
, as her
successor.
MODERN LEGAL FORMS, supra note 54, at § 9751.

148. Probate Act of 1975 § 6-16, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 6-16 (1975)
(formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 81 (1939)), which provides:
Unless otherwise expressly provided by the will, an administrator with the will annexed has all the powers and duties of the executor under the will, but this does not excuse the administrator from
giving security on his bond.
149. If the testator desires the appointed administrator to have the
same powers as the executor, he or she may insert the phrase "including
an administrator with the will annexed" after the words executor or personal representative in the clause a ppointing his executor. See O'BYRNE
& MCCORD, DESKBOOK FOR ILLINOIS ESTATE PLANNERS § 3C0.8 (1969).
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often result in defeating the testator's actual intentions. The interpretation of a will lacking any expression of intent regarding
a particular situation, may also result in defeating the testator's
actual intentions, since the courts will turn to the provisions of
the Probate Act to fill in the gaps in the distribution and administration of the testator's estate. Such a result can be avoided,
if the testator's intention is clearly expressed in the will, since
the court's interpretation must be governed by the testator's
manifest intention.'1
A review of the provisions of the Probate Act subject to
contrary will intent highlights the key areas in which the client's
intentions must be ascertained. The client's intention must
cover, not only the situations involved in these provisions of the
Probate Act, but also contingencies which may occur during the
client's lifetime or during the administration of his estate. Testamentary provisions must be drafted so as to unambiguously declare the testator's intentions.
Even though a clearly manifested intention is sufficient to
contravene the statutory dictates of the Probate Act, it may be
wise for the draftsman to refer to the Probate Act when desiring
to provide in lieu of the Act's provisions. If the testator wishes
to comply with the Act's provisions, a clearly expressed intent
to do so could also be incorporated into the will by the draftsman. Such a provision would decrease the vulnerability of wills
to expensive contest proceedings and provide the court with little
opportunity to defeat the actual intention of the testator by
judicial construction.
Louise M. Calvert

150. See notes 1-4 and accompanying text supra.

